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Anxiety has wide reaching effects on cognition; evidenced most prominently by the
“difficulties concentrating” seen in anxiety disorders, and by adaptive harm-avoidant
behaviors adopted under threatening circumstances. Despite having critical implications
for daily-living, the precise impact of anxiety on cognition is as yet poorly quantified.
Here we attempt to clarify the impact of anxiety on sustained attention and response
inhibition via a translational anxiety induction in healthy individuals (N = 22). Specifically,
in a within-subjects design, participants completed the Sustained Attention to Response
Task (SART) in which subjects withhold responses to infrequent no-go stimuli under threat
of unpredictable electrical shock (anxious) and safe (non-anxious) conditions. Different
studies have argued that this task measures either (1) attention lapses due to off-task
thinking or (2) response inhibition; two cognitive functions which are likely impacted by
anxiety. We show that threat of shock significantly reduces errors of commission on the
no-go trials relative to the safe condition whilst having no effect on go trials or overall
reaction time (RT). We suggest that this is because threat of shock during SART promotes
response inhibition. In particular we argue that, by virtue of frequency, subjects acquire
a habitual bias toward a go response which impairs no-go performance and that threat of
shock improves the ability to withhold these prepotent responses. This improved response
inhibition likely falls within the range of adaptive cognitive functions which promote
cautious harm avoidance under threatening conditions, although a range of alternative
explanations for this effect is discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Anxiety can significantly alter cognitive function (Robinson et al.,
submitted). Prominent symptoms of anxiety disorders include
attentional lapses and difficulty concentrating; sufferers often
complain of an inability to stay focused on tasks because they are
highly distractible. At the same time, in certain contexts—such
as walking alone in the dark—anxiety can promote an adaptive
state of improved vigilance and defense mobilization (Grillon
and Charney, 2011). Whereas the effects of attentional capture by
acute threat cues on cognitive performance is well-documented
(e.g., threatening words alter performance on emotional Stroop
tasks) (Algom, 2004; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2011; Padmala et al.,
2011; Sagaspe et al., 2011; Pessoa et al., 2012), relatively little is
known about the precise quantitative effects of more sustained
anxiety states on cognitive and behavioral performance.
The present study examined the effect of sustained anxiety
induced by unpredictable shock (Robinson et al., 2011; Cornwell
et al., 2012) anticipation on performance of a go/no-go task
designed to probe distraction (Robertson et al., 1997). In this
so-called “sustained attention to response task” (SART), sub-
jects are presented with frequent “go” stimuli, to which they
have to respond, and infrequent “no-go” stimuli, to which they
have to withhold responses (Robertson et al., 1997). This task
was developed to measure lapses of attention and slips of action
(i.e., off-task thinking) as indexed by errors of commission; e.g.,
inappropriate responses to the infrequent no-go trials (i.e., failed
response inhibition). The impact of sustained anxiety on this task
is, as yet, unknown.
Errors of commission on this task have been attributed to a
number of different causes. One argument is that errors of com-
mission represent “mind-wandering” or off-task thinking caused
by boredom (Smallwood et al., 2004, 2009) and/or executive con-
trol failure (McVay and Kane, 2010). Mind-wandering involves
relatively complex trains of thought which are primarily associ-
ated with the individual’s current concerns (Klinger, 2009) and
cause distraction from the task. However, this “mindless” the-
ory of performance failure is not unanimously accepted. It is
also argued that the task is a measure of response inhibition and
impulsivity (Helton, 2008; Helton et al., 2009, 2010). Specifically,
it is believed that the frequent go trials lead to a build-up of
feed-forward, habitual, motor routines, which preserve task per-
formance whilst reducing cognitive load. These responses are
monitored by a supervisory system which controls “the strategic
choices regarding the speed and accuracy of responses” (Helton
et al., 2009). The supervisory attention system requires processing
resources and can be weakened by cognitive load induced by task-
relevant or -irrelevant thoughts, which leads to speeded reaction
time (RT), increased RT variability, reduced response inhibition,
and increased likelihood of errors of commission.
Anxiety induced by threat of shock has a wide range of effects
on cognition (see Robinson et al., submitted), which leads to
conflicting hypotheses regarding the impact of anxiety on this
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task. Anxiety could impair performance because it impairs execu-
tive control mechanisms that help maintain goal-directed behav-
iors (Bishop, 2009). It could also impair performance because
threat of shock promotes lapses of attention andmind-wandering
(e.g., off-task thinking) due to repetitive intrusive thoughts and
worries (Watkins, 2008). This hypothesis is supported by reports
that a lack of concentration in high state anxiety is correlated with
mind-wandering (Watts and Sharrock, 1985) and with the obser-
vation that negative (i.e., sad) mood increases mind-wandering
on the SART (Smallwood et al., 2007, 2009).
However, several lines of evidence point to the opposite
hypothesis; that threat of shock should reduce errors of com-
mission on SART. First, anxiety can facilitate perceptual/sensory
processing (Robinson et al., submitted), which could lead to
improved perception and detection of the infrequent no-go trials.
Second, trait anxiety has been associated with enhanced response
inhibition in go/no-go experiments (Sehlmeyer et al., 2010).
Indeed, anxiety induced by threat of shock can increase inhibi-
tion of motor responses (Grillon and Davis, 2007; Cornwell et al.,
2008). Specifically, prepulse inhibition, the mechanism by which
a week sensory stimulus can, via temporal proximity, reduce eye-
blink startle response to a loud noise, is increased by threat of
shock. In particular, threat of shock serves to increase the abil-
ity of a weak acoustic or tactile “prepulse” stimulus to gate startle
motor responding (Cornwell et al., 2008).
In this study, we therefore sought to discriminate between
these conflicting possibilities and clarify the effects of anxiety on
the SART. Subjects completed the SART task under conditions
where they were at risk from-, and safe from, unpredictable shock.
The main analysis focused on trial by trial RT and errors of com-
mission, but we also examined RT to the trials that preceded
no-go trials (Robertson et al., 1997) as errors of commission on
no-go SART trials are commonly preceded by faster respond-
ing (Robertson et al., 1997). This has been argued to reflect an
automatic mode of processing and off-task thinking (Robertson
et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004) but could also be interpreted
as evidence of feed-forward prepotent, habitual motor response,
and speed/accuracy trade-off (Helton, 2008). Finally, we exam-
ined self-report of off-task thinking (Smallwood et al., 2007) by
asking subjects whether they were focusing on the task or if they
experienced off-task thinking (anxious or otherwise).
Thus, a reading of the prior literature leads to conflicting
hypotheses. On the one hand, anxiety could reduce the abil-
ity to maintain attention across trials through increased atten-
tional lapses and anxiety-related thoughts manifested as increased
RT variability and enhanced rates of errors of commission. On
the other hand, anxiety could reduce errors of commission by
improving sensory perception and/or response inhibition. Here,
we aimed to distinguish between these two possibilities by exam-
ining the effect of anxiety induced by threat of shock on perfor-
mance during SART.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty two healthy volunteers (11 males, 11 females) between the
ages of 20 and 34 (mean 27) were compensated for completing the
study. Inclusion criteria were: (1) no past or current psychiatric
disorders according to SCID-I/P (First et al., 2002), (2) no history
of a psychiatric disorder in any first-degree relatives; (3) no med-
ical condition that interfered with the objectives of the study as
established by a physician, and (4) no use of illicit drugs or psy-
choactive medications according to history and confirmed by a
negative urine screen. All participants gave written informed con-
sent approved by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
Human Investigation Review Board.
PROCEDURE
Following attachment of the electrodes, nine startle stimuli
(habituation) were delivered every 18–25 s. This was followed by
a shock work-up procedure to set up the shock intensity at a level
highly annoying and mildly painful. Next, subjects performed a
variant of SART (Robertson et al., 1997) when safe from shock
and when anticipating shock.
SART
Participants were asked to respond to frequent “go” stimuli (“=”)
by pressing the space bar and to withdraw their response to rare
“no-go” stimuli (“O”). These stimuli were randomly distributed
and were presented for 250ms at a rate of one every 2000ms and
there was no response deadline. There were a total of eight contin-
uous 106-s SART blocks, four safe blocks, and four threat blocks
that alternated. In each block, the go stimuli were presented on
either 47 or 48 occasions while the no-go stimulus occurred four
or five times per block for a total of 190 go and 18 no-go trials
(adding up to 9.5% of total trials) per safe or threat condition.
Three startle stimuli were delivered in each block to assess sub-
jects’ psychophysiological concomitants of anxiety during shock
anticipation. The first SART block was a safe condition in half the
subjects and it was a threat condition in the other half. Subjects
were asked to give equal weight to speed and accuracy. A single
shock was presented mid-block prior the final trial of two sepa-
rate threat conditions, thus there were two shocks within a period
of ∼15min; a sustained state of anxiety.
QUESTIONNAIRES
Subjective reports of on- and off-task thoughts as well as subjec-
tive anxiety were assessed after each block. Immediately after a
block ended, subjects were asked to retrospectively rate their level
of anxiety on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all anxious) to 10
(extremely anxious). On- and off-task thinking was evaluated by
asking subjects about their thoughts at the time the block ended.
They had to select one of the three choices indicating that they
were (1) thinking about the task, (2) thinking about something
unrelated (but not an anxious thought), or (3) having anxious
thoughts. The sum total of each thought category was determined
for each participant under each condition and the mean anxiety
rating recorded for each condition.
STIMULATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES
Stimulation and recording were controlled by a commercial sys-
tem (Contact Precision Instruments, UK). The acoustic startle
stimulus was a 40ms duration 103-dB (A) burst of white noise
presented through headphones. The eyeblink reflex was recorded
with electrodes placed under the left eye. The electromyographic
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(EMG) signal was amplifier with bandwidth set to 30–500Hz and
digitized at a rate of 1000Hz. The shock was administered on the
left wrist.
DATA ANALYSIS
Following rectification and smoothing of the EMG signal, peak
startle/eyeblink magnitude was determined in the 20–100-ms
timeframe following stimulus onset relative to a 50-ms prestimu-
lus baseline. The startle magnitude scores were averaged within
the safe and the threat condition. Performance accuracy was
determined for each condition (threat/safe) trial type (go/no-go)
by dividing the number of correct trials by the total number of
each trial type. The one trial following a shock was excluded from
analyses. During the go condition, correct responses were any trial
in which there was a response and in the no-go condition, correct
trials are the ones in which no response was provided. RTs for
correct go trials and incorrect no-go trials (errors of commission)
were averaged across each condition. Response variability was
determined by calculating the standard deviation in RT for (cor-
rect) go trials for each subject. To examine pre-error responses
(Robertson et al., 1997), RTs were averaged across the four stim-
uli before no-go trials (Table 1), averaged across condition, and
stratified by whether the subsequent no-go trial was or was not
successful. The startle magnitude and subjective anxiety scores
were averaged across blocks within each condition. Data were
analyzed with repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA)
and T-tests.
RESULTS
SART PERFORMANCE
Accuracy was analyzed using a condition (safe, threat)× trial type
(go, no-go) ANOVA. Consistent with previous results (Robertson
et al., 1997), subjects were less accurate in responses to no-go
trials compared to go trials [main effect of trial type; F(1, 21) =
8.6, p = 0.008] as well as less accurate under safe relative to
threat [F(1, 21) = 4.7, p = 0.04]. However, accuracy to no-go tri-
als was differently affected by the safe/threat conditions, leading
to a significant condition × trial type interaction [F(1, 21) = 8.9,
p = 0.007]. The interaction was driven by a significant increase in
no-go trial accuracy under threat relative to safe [F(1, 21) = 6.8,
P = 0.017; Figure 1]. Such a change in accuracy was not present
for go trials [F(1, 21) = 0.004, P = 0.9]. There was no signifi-
cant difference in RT for correct go trials [t(21) = 0.3, P = 0.8]
or failed no-go trials [in which a response was recorded; t(20) =
Table 1 | Behavioral measures; RT = reaction time (ms).
Threat Safe
No-Go Go No-Go Go
Accuracy 0.79 (0.05) 0.90 (0.02) 0.70 (0.06) 0.90 (0.02)
RT 370 (46) 361 (17) 295 (18) 359 (14)
No-Go No-Go No-Go No-Go
fail success fail success
Pre RT 293 (9) 357 (23) 316 (14) 364 (16)
FIGURE 1 | Response Accuracy; threat of shock significantly improved
no-go accuracy (∗p < 0.05), while having no effect upon go accuracy
(NS = not significant), error bars represent standard error of the mean.
1.7, P = 0.1; note that this is a small number of trials so inter-
pretation is limited; degrees of freedom in t-test is 20 because
one subject had 100% accuracy]. RT variability was comparable
across both safe and threat (SEM = 14 and 16ms respectively)
and a comparison of the standard deviation of each subject’s go
trials under safe and threat was not significant [t(21) = −0.04,
p = 0.97].
The pre-no-go trial RT were analyzed in a condition (safe,
threat) × accuracy (fail, success) ANOVA. Results show a sig-
nificant main effect of accuracy [F(1, 18) = 15, p = 0.001] due to
faster RT preceding failed compared to successful no-go responses
that was not affected by the threat of shock {no condition ×
accuracy interaction; [F(1, 18) = 0.4, p = 0.54]}. However, these
results should also be treated with caution because they comprise
a relatively small number of trials, particularly for failed no-go tri-
als. Overall behavioral measures for each trial type and condition
are presented in Table 1.
ANXIETY MEASURES
There was a significant increase in state anxiety ratings under the
threat (mean 5 ± 2) vs. safe (mean 2 ± 2) conditions [t(21) = 6.8,
P < 0.001]. This was associated with a comparable significant
increase in raw startle response under threat (38) relative to safe
(18) t(21) = 3.3, p = 0.005.
PROBES OF ON-AND OFF-TASK THINKING
Following each block of the task, subjects thought equally
about the task under threat and safe [T(21) = 0.38, p = 0.7],
but had more anxious thoughts under threat relative to safe
[T(21) = −3.2, p = 0.005], and more unrelated thoughts under
safe relative to threat [T(21) = 4.2, p < 0.001].
DISCUSSION
The main result of this study is that anxiety induced by threat of
shock reduced errors of commission without affecting response
speed or variability. These findings do not therefore support the
hypothesis that threat of shock increased off-task thinking; as this
would be expected to impair performance. Rather, we argue that
induced-anxiety improved response inhibition.
We think that the most plausible explanation for better no-
go accuracy during threat of shock is improved motor response
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inhibition. This is consistent with a number of different lines
of research. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, anxiety acti-
vates inhibitory behaviors. In fact, freezing is a well-established
measure of anxiety (Gray and McNaughton, 2003). Secondly,
event-related potential studies have suggested that trait anxiety
is associated with enhanced motor response inhibition during
no-go trials (Righi et al., 2009; Sehlmeyer et al., 2010). Thirdly,
induced anxiety also increases prepulse inhibition of startle, that
is, the ability to inhibit a startle motor response following a pre-
pulse stimulus (Grillon and Davis, 2007; Cornwell et al., 2008).
Indeed, the proportion of no-go trials in the SART is very low
compared to the frequent go trials. As such, the task may be
more a test of reactive stopping than proactive stopping (Aron,
2011). Specifically, by virtue of being more frequent, the go tar-
gets may acquire a bias toward habitual responding. Hence, no-go
trials may be less about deciding not to go than countermanding
an initiated prepotent response (Aron, 2011). Thus, anxiety may
improve the ability to inhibit habitual responding. Such facilita-
tion is of clear adaptive value as it may reduce the likelihood of
an inappropriate motoric urge or impulsive response when threat
looms.
The pattern of performance during SART could, however,
potentially be due to the fact that anxiety facilitated detection
of the no-go stimuli. Two potential mechanisms could lead to
such an improvement: enhanced perception or focused atten-
tion. Substantial evidence shows that induced-anxiety facilitates
perceptual/sensory processing (reviewed in Robinson et al., sub-
mitted). Such facilitation could help detect no-go trials. However,
there is also evidence that anxiety increases the selectivity of
attention. According to Easterbrook (1959)’s attentional breadth
theory, anxiety narrows attention, reducing distraction by task-
irrelevant peripheral stimuli. This view has been supported by
several studies in which anxiety evoked by the anticipation of
shocks leads to improved target detection (Agnew and Agnew,
1963; Tecce and Happ, 1964; Hu et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it
seems unlikely that performance improvement under threat of
shock was due to a better ability to detect or attend to stimuli on
such a simple task with low perceptual load. First, several authors
have noted that “Participants have no difficulty seeing and identi-
fying the target” during SART (Cheyne et al., 2009; Helton et al.,
2009). Second, as evidenced by the present data, participants only
have difficulty withholding a response to the no-go trials; go tri-
als, which are of equivalent perceptual demand, are uninfluenced.
Third, on tasks specifically designed to probe vigilance, threat of
shock actually serves to impair perception on high-load visual
scanning tasks, whilst leaving low-load tasks intact (Cain et al.,
2011). Thus, although firm conclusionmust await further studies,
it seems unlikely that the greater accuracy on no-go trials during
threat of shock was driven by facilitated perception of or attention
toward no-go stimuli.
Another possible explanation for improved performance dur-
ing threat of shock is a non-specific increase in awakeness/arousal
[i.e., alertness on a sleep wake spectrum (Oken et al., 2006)].
Anxiety increases arousal (Baas et al., 2006; Cornwell et al., 2007)
and arousal can help maintain sustained attention (Oken et al.,
2006). However, a key component of arousal is that it tends
to decrease over time; and effect which is thought to underlie
a phenomenon known as “vigilance decrement” (Helton, 2008;
Warm et al., 2008; Helton et al., 2009). In particular, traditional
sustained attention tasks are of long duration (longer than the
SART) and require subjects to detect very rare targets. Such tasks
are typically associated with a progressive decrement in perfor-
mance thought to be driven, in turn, by progressively decreasing
arousal (Helton, 2008; Helton et al., 2009). Errors of commis-
sion on the SART have, however, been shown to decrease over
time when the test is repeated (Helton, 2008; Helton et al., 2009)
which, if anything, would indicate increasing arousal as the task
progressed. Helton and others have in fact argued that, rather
than measuring sustained attention per se, performance on the
SART reflects a strategic decision regarding speed/accuracy trade-
off (Helton, 2008). This hypothesis is based on the observation
that, over time, errors of commission go down while RT goes
up (Helton, 2008). The present study, as well as previous studies
(Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004), provide further
support for this speed accuracy trade-off argument by demon-
strating that errors of commission are preceded by faster RT than
non-errors. Thus, more cautious RT leads to greater accuracy.
However, this effect does not vary across safe/threat conditions
and hence unlikely explains the improved performance under
threat. In other words, threat seems to improve accuracy at no cost
to speed, providing no evidence for a speed/accuracy trade-off.
It should be noted that the effect seen here is distinct from
that seen when discrete threatening or aversive cues are utilized
in go/no-go tasks. For instance cues which have been paired
with shocks as well as aversive faces [more analogous to “fear”
than “anxiety” (Grillon, 2008)] serve to impair inhibitory control
(Padmala et al., 2011; Sagaspe et al., 2011; Pessoa et al., 2012).
Indeed, anxiety can impair inhibitory control in the context of
affective targets in Stroop like paradigms (Pacheco-Unguetti et al.,
2011). The key difference between these studies and the present
study is that in the present task the stimuli are affectively neutral.
Indeed, for the purposes of harm avoidance, it makes adaptive
sense to allocate resources toward threatening stimuli in the con-
text of anxiety (even at the expense of impaired inhibition). At the
same time, it makes sense to improve the overall ability to inhibit
responding in the absence of threatening stimuli. Thus, the overall
behavior is likely the result of an interaction between the sus-
tained state (anxiety), the valence of the stimuli being processed
(e.g., aversive vs. neutral stimuli) and the motor response.
In summary, we present novel data demonstrating that
anxiety induced by threat of shock can improve the abil-
ity to withhold responses to infrequent targets on a go/no-
go task. We argue that this effect reflects facilitated inhibi-
tion of habitual motor responses, which may be a part of a
broader pattern of anxiety improving cognitive and percep-
tual processes, perhaps for the sake of better improving harm
avoidance (Robinson et al., submitted). It should be noted
that errors of commission during SART have been typically
used as evidence of mind-wandering (Robertson et al., 1997;
Smallwood et al., 2004, 2009). However, errors of commis-
sion are only indirect measures of mind-wandering and can be
affected by other processes, such as changes in perceptual pro-
cessing or response inhibition. We believe that reduced errors
of commission in the present study did not reflect reduced
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off-task thinking during threat of shock but better response inhi-
bition, although we also believe SART may be useful to study
off-task thinking and more specifically anxious thoughts. Future
studies may attempt to use more comprehensive thought sam-
pling methodologies (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006) to tap into
subjective experiences, as well as attempt to clarify the neural
substrates of this effect using fMRI and EEG, in both healthy and
patient populations.
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